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abstract: Evolutionary theory predicts that mutualisms based on
the reciprocal exchange of costly services should be susceptible to
exploitation by cheaters. Consistent with theory, both cheating and
discrimination against cheaters are ubiquitous features of mutu-
alisms. Several recent studies have confirmed that host species differ
in the extent that they are able to discriminate against cheaters,
suggesting that cheating may be stabilized by the existence of sus-
ceptible hosts (dubbed “givers”). We use an evolutionary game-
theoretical approach to demonstrate how discriminating and giver
hosts associating with mutualist and cheater partners can coexist.
Discriminators drive the proportion of cheaters below a critical
threshold, at which point there is no benefit to investing resources
into discrimination. This promotes givers, who benefit from mu-
tualists but allow cheater populations to rebound. We then apply
this model to the plant-mycorrhizal mutualism and demonstrate
it is one mechanism for generating host-specific responses to my-
corrhizal fungal species necessary to generate negative plant-soil
feedbacks. Our model makes several falsifiable, qualitative predic-
tions for plant-mycorrhizal population dynamics across gradients
of soil phosphorus availability and interhost differences in ability
to discriminate. Finally, we suggest applications and limitations of
the model with regard to coexistence in specific biological systems.
Keywords: host sanctions, mutualism, mycorrhiza, plant-soil feed-
backs, species coexistence, soil phosphorus.
Introduction
Every reciprocal partnership is susceptible to exploitation
(Yu 2001). This is particularly true in horizontal mutu-
alisms where partners are able to disperse among neigh-
boring hosts, a phenomenon that decouples host and part-
ner fitness. Evolutionary theory predicts that horizontal
mutualisms should be unstable due to fitness incentives
for partners to defect or exploit the benefits of mutualism
without investing resources. Although there are special sit-
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uations where horizontal mutualisms are stabilized against
cheaters, such as when partners are close kin (Hamilton
1964) or when repeat encounters with the same partners
provide incentives to cooperate (Axelrod and Hamilton
1981), many diverse and ubiquitous mutualisms lack these
qualities (Douglas 2008; Kiers and Dennison 2008). Nev-
ertheless, horizontal mutualisms are both common in na-
ture and persistent over evolutionary time, even in the
presence of specialized cheaters. These mutualisms are sta-
bilized by host discrimination, where a host invests re-
sources into maintaining an environment that selectively
promotes cooperative partners (Archetti et al. 2011).
In plants, mechanisms of discrimination include cre-
ating a chemical environment that is toxic to cheaters
(Ruby and McFall-Nagi 1999), selectively aborting mod-
ular structures colonized by cheaters (Pellmyr and Huth
1994), and preferentially allocating resources to coopera-
tive partners (Bever et al. 2009; Kiers et al. 2011). For
simplicity, we call hosts that employ these mechanisms
“discriminators,” while hosts that forgo discrimination are
called “givers.” The existence of discrimination mecha-
nisms across so many mutualisms presents a paradox—if
discrimination is effective, why are there cheaters, and if
there are no cheaters, why maintain traits for discrim-
ination?
Foster and Kokko (2006) provide one answer to this
paradox—host discrimination can be stabilized in popu-
lations where mutation/immigration reintroduces vari-
ability in the partner population’s tendency to cooperate
(or cheat). However, this seeded variability is only one
mechanism for maintaining cheaters in the partner pop-
ulation. An alternative mechanism is one that involves
negative feedbacks among coexisting species, such that
giver hosts act as a susceptible reservoir for the production
of cheater partners, while discriminator hosts sustain suf-
ficient mutualists to prevent cheaters from driving the
givers extinct. Indeed, the requisite cheaters and variability
in host species’ ability to discriminate is documented in
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the mutualisms between figs and pollinator wasps (Jandér
and Herre 2010), Acacia and herbivore defense ants (Heil
et al. 2009), and plants and mycorrhiza that enhance nu-
trient acquisition (Bever et al. 2009; Kiers et al. 2011;
Grman 2012).
Fitness trade-offs between discriminating against cheat-
ers and deriving benefit from cooperative partners may
help level the playing field among host species. Several
recent studies suggest that discriminating hosts derive rel-
atively less benefit from cooperative partners than their
giving competitors. For example, fig species associated
with strong sanctions against cheater wasps have floral
traits that reduce their maximum achievable seed yield
relative to figs that tolerate cheating (Herre 1989; Jandér
and Herre 2010). Acacia species that are better at pro-
moting vigilant defensive ant species invest more resources
into costly extrafloral nectaries than species that tolerate
cheater, nondefensive ants (Heil et al. 2009). Plant hosts
capable of reducing carbon allocation to mycorrhiza in
conditions where the mycorrhiza do not promote growth
and nutrition derive less benefit from mycorrhiza in con-
ditions when the fungi cooperate (Grman 2012; Grman
and Robinson 2013). In these examples, discrimination is
a costly bet-hedging strategy that reduces both the harm
of associating with a cheater partner and the benefit of
associating with a cooperative partner.
The same discrimination that ensures hosts benefit from
mutualist partners’ function has the ability to increase the
density of mutualists relative to cheaters in the partner
population. This represents a noninclusive benefit of dis-
crimination, as it can be exploited by hosts that benefit
from cooperative partners without paying the cost of dis-
crimination (the givers). However, while giver hosts reap
greater rewards from cooperative partners, they are also
defenseless against exploitation by cheaters. A combination
of discrimination trade-offs and impacts on the partner
community have the potential to promote negative density
dependent feedback, where both discriminating and giving
hosts alter the partner population in ways that benefit their
competitors more than themselves.
Here we define an evolutionary game-theory model to
show how the costs of discrimination can lead to the co-
existence of discriminating and giving hosts and cooper-
ative and cheating partners. We then apply our model to
the plant-mycorrhizal mutualism and use it to develop
qualitative predictions about population dynamics across
gradients of soil resource availability. Finally, we suggest
future applications of the model.
General Model Framework
Game-theoretical assumptions are that the population is
infinite, phenotypes breed true, and fitness is determined
through interactions with other phenotypes. We are using
an asymmetrical model, where hosts and partners repre-
sent exclusive guilds. Hosts are considered to have little
or no incentive to cheat, while partners have high incen-
tives to cheat. This is the case for large hosts associating
with multiple smaller partners with a higher intrinsic re-
productive rate and ability to disperse propagules to neigh-
boring hosts (Douglas 2008).
The players in our game are discriminator and giver
hosts and mutualist and cheater partners. In order to keep
track of host versus partner payoffs and proportions, we
adopted a notation of capital letters for hosts and lowercase
letters for partners. Giver hosts receive a benefit (B) from
associating with a mutualist and pay a cost (K) when as-
sociating with a cheater. In contrast, discriminators ex-
perience a functional trade-off that reduces the benefit of
associating with a mutualist partner and decreases the
harm of associating with a cheater (fig. 1A). This is
achieved mathematically by dividing the benefit and cost
terms by the quotients (1  r) and (1  br), respectively,
where r represents the magnitude of the trade-off (high
r p strong trade-off) and b is a scalar term that determines
the proportionality of the reductions in K and B (fig. 1A,
1B). For example, when r p 1, a discriminating host re-
ceives half the maximum benefit (B) from associating with
a mutualist partner. When b p 1, this results in a similar
halving of the cost (K) of associating with a cheater, while
a b ! 1 results in a proportionally larger reduction in
benefit relative to cost.
Partner strategies differ from hosts principally in having
an incentive to cheat. Mutualist partners invest resources
(z) into and receive a benefit (b) from their hosts. Cheater
partners reap a benefit from giver hosts without paying a
cost, but receive a benefit divided by the quotient (1 
ar) when associating with a discriminator, where a is an
additional scalar term that determines how strongly the
host fitness trade-off influences cheater partner fitness (fig.
1C, 1D). Thus, a 1 0 results in reductions in cheater fitness
with increases in discrimination (r). For simplicity, we will
consider a case where increases in the host trade-off r
results in a reduction in the fitness of cheaters and a pro-
portional decrease in the benefits and costs of associating
with mutualists and cheaters (or b p a p 1). These fitness
payoffs can be represented in the form of a payoff matrix
(table 1).
The fitness of each phenotype is equal to their per capita
growth rates and is determined by taking the sum of their
expected payoffs, weighted by the frequency of those pay-
offs. For instance, the fitness of the mutualist partner, Wm,
can be determined from the following equation:
W p D # E(m, D)  (1  D)E(m, G),m
where E(m, D) and E(m, G) are the expected payoffs to
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Figure 1: A, Fitness benefit (y) to the host of associating with a mutualist and cheater as a function of discrimination (r), with the critical
level of discrimination required to give mutualist partners a competitive advantage indicated by and an arbitrary large value of r p 2r̂
indicated as an example. B, Fitness of discriminator (at r p 2) and giver hosts as a function of mutualist partners, with the intersection
point marked . C, Fitness benefit to the partners of being a mutualist or cheater on a plant with discrimination r, with the critical levelm̂
of discrimination indicated by and the arbitrary level of r p 2 indicated as in A. D, Fitness of mutualist and cheater partners as a functionr̂
of discriminator hosts, with the intersection point marked . E, Cyclical population dynamics of partners (X-axis) and hosts (Y-axis)D̂
indicated by vector lines when both and are between 0 and 1. To the right of E, the equations for , , and are indicated. B, D,ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆm D r m D
and E: b p B p 5, z p K p 2, r p 2, and a p b p 1.
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Table 1: Expected payoffs for hosts and partners




1r b  z; B Wm p b  z
Cheater (1  m)
;
b K
1ar 1br b; K
1
W p b 1  D[ ( )]c 1ar
Host fitness mB (1m)K
W p D 1r 1br WG p m(b  k)  k
Note: Expected payoff bimatrix for partners (rows, left element) and hosts (columns, right element). Terms
B and b are the benefit to the mutualism to hosts and partners, respectively, while z is the cost of the mutualism
to the partner and K is the cost to the host of associating with a cheater. These terms are expressed in units
of per capita growth rate, while the extent of host discrimination (r) and the terms a and b are scalars that
adjust the fitness of discriminator hosts and/or cheater partners.
the mutualist partner when associating with discriminator
(D) and giver (G p 1  D) hosts, respectively. In this
case, the fitness equation simplifies to Wm p b  z. The
fitness equations of each phenotype are calculated in the
same manner (table 1). Note that the fitness of each strat-
egy x is is denoted as Wx.
The increase in the proportion of discriminator hosts
and mutualist partners is determined from the replicator
equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), such that
dm
p m(1  m)(W  W ),m cdt
dD
p D(1  D)(W  W ),D Gdt
for mutualists and discriminators, respectively.
One potential outcome of this model is coexistence via
stable oscillations around an equilibrium point, which will
occur whenever the zero growth isoclines for both host
and partner strategies intersect (i.e., fall between 0 and 1;
fig. 1E). To determine the zero growth isocline for the
hosts, we set the rate of change for host strategies equal
to 0 (dD/dt p 0) and solve the equality of both host
fitnesses (WD p WG) in terms of the proportion of mu-
tualists ( ; fig. 1B). In this case,m̂
bK(1  r)
m̂ p .
B(1  br)  bK(1  r)
The host isocline ( ) will fall between 0 and 1 wheneverm̂
all of the model terms are positive, a situation consistent
with partners capable of either benefiting (B 1 0) or harm-
ing (K 1 0) hosts and discriminators experiencing both
reduced benefit (r 1 0) and harm (b 1 0) from mutualist
and cheater partners, respectively. If we do the same thing
for the zero growth isocline of the partners, we can solve
for Wm p Wc in terms of the proportion of discriminator
hosts, or
z 1  ar
D̂ p .( )b ar
Thus, the position of the partner isocline is dependent
on the cost to benefit ratio of mutualism (z/b) and the
degree to which discriminating hosts reduce the benefit of
cheating (proportional to ar). Only discrimination beyond
a critical level ( ) is sufficient to reduce the benefit ofr̂




If we consider a case where discrimination exceeds , thenr̂
the position of the partner zero growth isocline ( ) willD̂
fall between 0 and 1 (fig. 1D). In addition, will fallD̂
between 0 and 1 only when the benefit of the mutualism
to the partners is greater than its cost (b 1 z). The existence
of an interior equilibrium point results in a population
dynamic where discriminating hosts have an ad-ˆ(r 1 r)
vantage when mutualists are below the host isocline
, while less discriminating hosts have anˆ ˆ(m ! m) (r ! r)
advantage when mutualists are above the host isocline
. The interior equilibrium point exhibits neutralˆ(m 1 m)
stability, such that the populations will cycle around it
without convergence or divergence (fig. 1E). This oscil-
lating population dynamic is analogs to that which occurs
in the familiar “battle of the sexes” model (Dawkins 1976),
where “coy” (discriminating) females demand a costly
courtship before copulation to insure they are matched
with “faithful” (mutualist) males, while “quick” (giver)
females do not demand courtship but are susceptible to
“philanderer” (cheater) males (see Schuster and Sigmund
1981).
In contrast to the interior equilibrium that results in
oscillating host and partner populations, there is an al-
ternative monomorphic (or Nash) equilibrium. Specifi-
cally, when the benefit of mutualism is less than or equal
to the cost (b ≤ z), only cheating is a viable strategy. If
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Figure 2: A, Terms in the payoff matrix shown graphically as a
function of soil P, with the benefit to the plant hosts and mycorrhizal
fungi partners (B and b) expressed as a right tailed unimodal curve
and the host cost of associating with a cheater (K) and the cost of
being a mutualist mycorrhizal fungi (z) indicated by a straight line
with negative slope, and the intersections indicated with vertical
dotted lines. The values are bmax p Bmax p 5 and kmax p Zmax p 3.
B, Critical level of discrimination ( ) as expressed as a function ofr̂
soil P, with the asymptotes where b p z indicated with vertical dotted
lines. Population dynamics leading to coexistence are possible when
discriminators have r values above the black line.
the cost of associating with a cheater is greater than 0
(K 1 0), then an unbeatable host strategy would be a
discriminator that minimizes this cost (r p ). Thus, in
our model, all cases where coexistence is impossible lead
to the breakdown of mutualism, with fixation of cheating
partners and unresponsive hosts.
Applying the Model to the Mycorrhizal Mutualism
In order to illustrate the utility of the model, we will apply
it to a specific mutualism. We use the association between
approximately 80% of all vascular plants and arbuscular
mycorrhizal (AM) fungi as a model system (Smith and
Read 2008), as it is pervasive, fits model assumptions, and
allows us to constrain variability in payoff matrix terms
along gradients of resource availability.
Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi live inside plant roots and
feed entirely on carbon (C) provided by their host. In
return, they produce filamentous networks of soil hyphae
that acquire nutrients and transfer them to the host plant.
Although the mutualism is multifunctional, the primary
exchange of resources is the allocation of host C for soil
phosphorus (P), with as much as 80% of a host plant’s
total P acquired via its mycorrhizal partner (Marschner
and Dell 1994).
In keeping with model assumptions, there is an asym-
metry between host and partner incentives to cheat. Ar-
buscular mycorrhizal fungi have a large incentive to cheat
(high cost of mutualism), with a steep trade-off between
providing host benefits via nutrient acquisition and en-
hancing their own competitive ability within a host root
(Bennett and Bever 2009; Bever et al. 2009). Consistent
with this finding, several generalist mycorrhizal species
have evolved to exploit plant C without providing any
benefits (Graham and Abbott 2000; Burleigh et al. 2002;
Smith et al. 2003, 2004; Koch et al. 2006; Violi et al. 2007).
In contrast, although plants provide up to 20% of their
fixed C to their mycorrhizal partners, the benefits of ac-
quiring limiting soil P can result in a net increase in pho-
tosynthetic rate that more than defrays this cost (Kaschuk
et al. 2009), such that plant cheaters appear to be restricted
to highly specialized mycoheterophic species that specialize
in low-light environments in the forest understory (Bi-
dartondo 2005). In this context, allocating C to mycor-
rhizal fungi is costly only if the fungal partner fails to
offset this investment with a sufficient augmentation of
host photosynthetic rate; that is, when a plant associates
with cheater fungi (with cost K).
In order to make our model tractable, we can constrain
variability among the terms in the expected payoff matrix
along a resource gradient. This has the benefit of providing
predictions for both descriptive and experimental ecolo-
gists. For the plant mycorrhizal mutualism, we do this by
defining the terms in the payoff matrix (table 1) as func-
tions of soil P that approximate qualitative findings in the
literature. Although these functions are somewhat crude
approximations, we restrict their use to determining the
relative fitness of host/partner strategies. The efficacy of
this approach can be evaluated based on its ability to derive
some of the known qualities of the plant-mycorrhizal fungi
mutualism within the model framework.
First we define soil P as a level between 0 and 1, with
0 representing the most impoverished soils on earth (e.g.,
southern Australia) and 1 the most P-enriched soils (ag-
ricultural and young, newly exposed soils). Plant host ben-
efits (B) have been demonstrated to peak on soils with
low level of P and decrease as soil P increases (Mosse 1973;
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Stribley et al. 1980; Johnson 1993; Treseder 2004; Hoek-
sema 2010). However, both experimental and agricultural
studies demonstrate that mycorrhiza fail to provide any
benefit to their hosts at extremely low levels of P avail-
ability (Koide and Li 1991; Ryan and Angus 2003). Thus,
the function for plant benefit, B(P), can be represented by
a right-tailed unimodal curve, with high benefits on low-
P soils dropping off gradually as soil P increases and more
abruptly on extremely P deficient soils. Mycorrhizal fungal
benefit is assumed to be proportional to plant benefit (see
Olsson et al. 2010) and is defined by the same function
(b(p) p B(p)) (fig. 2A; appendix).
We hypothesize that both the cost to the plant of being
exploited by a cheater mycorrhiza (K) and the cost of
cooperation to mutualist mycorrhiza (z) decrease linearly
as soil P increases. This is consistent with the qualitative
findings that plant hosts can meet P demands on highly
fertile soils without fungal assistance and mutualist fungi
pay a higher cost to deliver P to plants when it is less
concentrated in the soil (reviewed by Johnson et al. 1996).
Thus, z(P) p K(P) p (1  P)kmax, with kmax equal to both
the maximum costs of being exploited by a cheater my-
corrhiza and of providing growth and nutritional benefits
to a plant host.
Consistent with the general model predictions, coexis-
tence is only possible when the critical level of discrimi-
nation is finite, which only occurs when the benefit of the
mutualism exceeds its cost (b 1 z) to the mycorrhizal fungi
(2B). This occurs at intermediate levels of the soil P gra-
dient, with the critical level of discrimination ( ) reachingr̂
infinity at very low and high levels of soil P. Infinite dis-
crimination, in turn, signals the breakdown of the sym-
bioses, as hosts can limit fitness losses only to cheater
partners. From a plant physiological point of view, this is
consistent with the benefits of nonmycotrophy at the ex-
treme ends of the soil P gradient.
Discussion
This model illustrates that hosts with different capacities
to discriminate against cheaters can coexist via negative
feedback on their partner communities. This is due to the
non-inclusive benefits of altering the composition of a
partner community, where givers benefit from but ulti-
mately reverse discriminator’s costly augmentation of mu-
tualist partners. While Foster and Kokko (2006) have dem-
onstrated the importance of variability in partner
cooperation to maintain host discrimination, our model
proposes that cheaters can facilitate host species coexis-
tence. The existence of host species with different capac-
ities to discriminate against cheater partners has recently
been demonstrated to occur in a wide variety of mutu-
alisms (Pellmyr 1994; Keirs et al. 2007; Bever et al. 2009;
Heil et al. 2009; Jandér and Herre 2010; Kiers et al. 2011;
Grman 2012), suggesting these population dynamics may
be a general feature of mutualisms. In this context, giving
and discriminating hosts act as reservoirs of the cheater
and mutualist partners each requires to coexist.
The stable oscillations generated by our model should
contribute to conspecific negative density dependence
(CNDD), where species alter their local environments in
ways that depress their population growth rates. The effects
of CNDD are proposed to be a powerful mechanism of
species coexistence, particularly in diverse tropical forests
(Janzen 1970; Connell 1971; Mangan et al. 2010) and,
more recently, broadly across North American forests
(Packer and Clay 2000; Nakashizuka 2001; HilleRis-
Lambers et al. 2002; McCarthy-Neumann and Kobe 2010;
Johnson et al. 2012). However, while CNDD is thought
to occur via the accumulation of species-specific pathogens
and predators, our model generates these effects via hosts’
impacts on partner communities that include cheaters.
Thus, discriminators augment the population of mutualist
partners until cheating is too rare to justify the cost of
discrimination, which promotes the greater relative pop-
ulation growth of giver hosts. When giver hosts reach a
critical density, it pays for partners to cheat, and the
cheater population increases.
We provided an example of how to apply our model to
the mutualism between plants and arbuscular mycorrhizal
fungi. By constraining variability of our model terms along
a resource gradient, we were able to provide several qual-
itative findings, as well as reproduce important features of
the mutualisms.
Examples of Model Application
In the plant-mycorrhizal mutualism, we found that soils
with low to intermediate levels of soil P should support
the coexistence of plant hosts and mycorrhizal fungi with
different tendencies to discriminate or cheat, respectively.
Fungal cheating and plant discrimination should become
winning strategies on both low- and high-P soils where
the cost of mutualism exceeds its benefit (z 1 b). These
findings are consistent with the absence of mycorrhizal
plants on the most impoverished soils on the globe (Lam-
bers et al. 2008) as well as the tendency of very P-rich
agricultural soils to support cheater strains of mycorrhiza
(Verbruggen and Kiers 2010).
The population oscillations in our model are analogous
to negative plant soil feedbacks, where fungi that accu-
mulate around conspecific plant hosts depress plant per-
formance relative to fungi from heterospecific plant hosts
(Bever 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Casper and Castelli 2003). Our
model demonstrates that trade-offs in the ability to pro-
mote mutualist partners and the benefit derived from those
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partners are one potential mechanism to generate mycor-
rhiza-mediated negative plant soil feedbacks. Further, a
closer examination of at least one frequently cited example
of negative plant soil feedback provides some support for
our model. Bever (2002a) found evidence for negative
feedbacks between Plantago, a highly mycotrophic forb,
and Panicum, a significantly less responsive grass, by gaug-
ing plant performance with either conspecific or heter-
ospecific live soil inocula. Further, they found evidence
that the feedbacks were caused by the accumulation for
different arbuscular mycorrhizal fungal species in the rhi-
zosphere of the plant hosts.
Several of the findings from the Bever et al. (2002a)
study are qualitatively consistent with our model, includ-
ing evidence that (i) discriminators plants experience a
trade-off in mycorrhizal responsiveness that negatively im-
pacts the fitness of cheater fungi, (ii) cheaters depress the
growth of highly responsive givers relative to less respon-
sive discriminators, and (iii) discriminators alter their
partner communities in ways that benefit givers more than
themselves. Thus, (i) the least beneficial mycorrhizal fun-
gal species accumulated around the highly mycotrophic
Plantago (giver) but not the less responsive Panicum (dis-
criminator); (ii) this fungal strain depressed the growth of
Plantago (giver) but not Panicum (discriminator); and (iii)
in contrast, two mycorrhizal fungal species that were
highly beneficial to Plantago (giver) but had only slightly
positive and/or negative to Panicum (discriminator) were
accumulated in the soil of Panicum. This example suggests
that the trade-offs required to generate coexistence in our
model are realized among competing host species.
Another potential application of our model is with re-
spect to the coexistence of highly mycotrophic warm (C4)
and lesser or nonmycotrophic cool (C3) season grasses in
tall grass prairie ecosystems. Recent work has demon-
strated that when fertilization reduces the benefit of my-
cotrophy, C3 plants have reduced levels of mycorrhizal
colonization, while C4 grasses are nonresponsive (Grman
2012; Grman and Robinson 2013). Thus, one could hy-
pothesize that C3 grasses are candidate discriminators,
while C4 grasses are candidate givers. However, as yet there
is no evidence that the reduction in mycorrhizal coloni-
zation in C3 grasses reduces the fitness of cheater more
strongly than mutualist mycorrhizal fungi. With respect
to our model, this would involve determining the sign and
magnitude of the scalar term a, which must be positive
and sufficiently large to reduce cheater fungi’s competitive
advantage relative to mutualists. An alternative strategy
would be for plants to minimize the harm of cheater fungi
without punishing them in the form of precise sanctions
(e.g., b 1 0 decreases the harm of cheating; a ≤ 0 fails to
punish cheaters).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although we evaluate only one trade-off axis in our model
(responding to mutualists vs. reducing the harm of cheat-
ers), it is likely that an additional trade-off exists between
host responsiveness to mutualist partners (B) and the abil-
ity of the host to acquire resources via a nonsymbiotic
pathway. Thus, while C3 grasses are less responsive to my-
corrhizal fungi than C4 grasses, they also tend to develop
finer and more branched root systems that could increase
their ability to acquire soil nutrients in the absence of
fungal partners (Grman 2012). Similarly, plants growing
on the most P-impoverished soils in the world develop
specialized cluster-roots that are generally nonmyco-
trophic and adapted to acquire nutrients in recalcitrant
chemical forms (Lambers 2008). This additional trade-off
axis could complicate our model by requiring additional
environmentally sensitive terms or altering the term a in
unpredictable ways.
The plant mycorrhizal system is easily amenable to a
model that involves feedbacks on hosts interacting with a
shared partner community. This is due to the lack of spec-
ificity between mycorrhiza and plant hosts, which allows
for host/partner feedbacks to act in a reciprocal fashion.
Out model could work equally well for other mutualisms
with low specificity of association, such as those between
legumes and nitrogen-fixing rhizobium. In contrast, our
model would have to altered to address the role of host-
specificity before it can be applied to highly coevolved
plant-pollinator systems (e.g., those among fig/fig-wasps
and yucca/yucca-moths). In these cases, the model in its
current form can only describe feedbacks within species.
Our model integrates the problem of stability in mu-
tualisms with the problem of diversity among coexisting
hosts. It provides one potential explanation for the co-
existence of host species that differ in their ability to dis-
criminate against cheaters. While this range of discrimi-
nation strengths is a relatively recently documented
phenomenon, we predict that, as species are known to
differ in almost every observable respect, interspecies dis-
crimination discrepancies will be revealed as a feature
common to all mutualisms. The efficacy of the model will
rest on experimental and descriptive studies of mutualisms
where the natural history is well enough understood that
these interspecies differences in discrimination can be
controlled.
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APPENDIX
Equations for Resource-Dependent Payoffs
An equation describing a right-tailed, unimodal curve is
used to specify the benefits of the plant hosts (B) and
fungal partners (b) along a gradient of soil phosphorus
(P) (fig. 2A). The functions are defined with respect to
two parameters—their shape and maximum value. These
two parameters can be measured empirically and influence
both the position of the equilibrium points in our model
and the range of soil P values that correspond to different
population dynamics (coexistence vs. dominance of non-
mycorrhizal plant hosts and cheater fungi).
First, we specify the shape of the relationship as
a bb(P) p P (1  P) ,
where a and b determine the position and steepness of the
peak. Next, we specify the maximum value for this func-
tion. This is done by normalizing the that the function
b(P) so that it has a range between 0 and 1. Finally, we
multiply the normalized function by our specified maxi-
mum value bmax so that the new function ranges between
0 and bmax.
First, we determine the level of soil phosphorus where
b(P) peaks, which is found by solving for P when the
derivative of b(P) is set equal to 0, or P p a/(a  b).
Next, the function b(P) is divided by b[ac/(a  b)], which
sets the maximum value equal to 1. If we multiply the
proportion of b(P)/b[ac/(a  b)] by our specified maxi-
mum value, we get
a b
b(P) a b
a b# b p P (1  P) b ,max max( ) ( )b[a/(a  b)] a  b a  b
which is a distribution with a fully specified shape and
maximum value. In figure 2A, the shape and maximum
values of functions b(P) and B(P) are defined by a p 0.5,
b p 2, and bmax p 5.
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Editor: Susan Kalisz
This content downloaded from 129.237.046.008 on July 28, 2016 08:37:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
